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D r. B. Mayer
ABSTRACT:
When confronted with one of the most terrible atrocities the world has seen, we often see 
differing reactions from the international community. Genocide has long been a difficult topic to 
grapple with due to its gruesome nature and its conflicts with sovereignty. Many nations believe 
to intervene would be to step on the national sovereignty of the country in question, while others 
believe that in ratifying the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide (1948) we are obligated to intervene in the name of peacekeeping and 
preservation of life. What remains to be evaluated is the application of the debate for and against 
humanitarian intervention in such cases. Through research involving personal memoirs from key 
decision makers, historical accounts of the time, personal interviews, and national laws and 
treaties, the purpose of this research aims to discover whether the critics of such intervention 
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One hotly contested instance of the forcible humanitarian intervention debate is the 
international community’s response to the genocide that took place in Rwanda in 1994. The 
international community found itself unwilling to be involved in stopping a genocide that was 
3.4 times more “efficient” than the Holocaust. Where the Holocaust had a daily death rate of 
2,350 victims, the Hutu genocidaires managed 8,000 (Svigor 2012). The 1994 genocide in 
Rwanda was not the world’s first instance of genocide. In the 1870s the “conquest of the desert,” 
a military campaign led by General Julio Argentino Roca established Argentine dominance over 
Patagonia and left approximately 1,300 indigenous people dead. Haiti, Mexico, Peru, Australia, 
New Zealand, France, Ireland, the Philippines, and the Russian Empire have all experienced 
genocide with varying death tolls in their histories (Naimark, N. M., Göçek, F., & Suny, R.
2011). In April 1915 Ottoman Empire authorities arrested approximately 250 Armenian 
community leaders as well as prominent citizens. Soon after, the Ottoman military uprooted 
Armenians from their homes, depriving them of food and water, eventually placing them in the 
desert of where is today Syria. Massacres of these people were indiscriminate and left between 
one million and one and a half million people dead. It was this tragedy that led to the coining of 
the term “genocide” by Raphael Lemkin, giving a name to a crime so heinous one had not 
existed previously for it (Naimark, N. M., Göçek, F., & Suny, R. 2011). Lemkin presented a draft 
resolution for a Genocide Convention treaty to several different states, urging them to be 
sponsors, eventually gaining recognition before the United Nations General Assembly (UNHCR 
1901). The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide was 
formally presented and adopted on December 9th, 1948. Not until 1951 did this come into full
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force after having the 20th nation ratify it (United Nations 1948). This provided a working 
definition and a list of crimes all falling under “genocide” to be used by the international 
community. The working definition and crimes as provided by the United Nations in Article 2 
of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 1948 is: any o f 
the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial, 
or religious group, as such: killing members o f the group; causing serious bodily or mental harm 
to members o f the group; deliberately inflicting on the group conditions o f life calculated to 
bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; imposing measures intended to prevent 
births within the group; and forcibly transferring children o f the group to another group (United 
Nations 1948).
These crimes fall under the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, which is 
governed by the Rome Statute, and is the first treaty based international criminal court 
established to “help end impunity for the perpetrators of the most serious crimes of concern to 
the international community” (UN General Assembly 1998). The ICC is independent and not 
part of the United Nations system. With the international acceptance of a definition of genocide, 
crimes against humanity, and war crimes the international community succeeded in creating a 
permanent international court. The Tokyo and Nuremburg trials addressed war crimes, crimes 
against peace, and crimes against humanity committed during the Second World War (UN 
General Assembly 1998). Similar results to those of such tribunals as the International Criminal 
Tribunals created for the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda were the results that exemption 
from guilt is unacceptable, but due to the time-frame and conflict specific nature of those 
tribunals, the ICC came into being July 17 1998 once 120 states adopted the Rome Statute as the 
legal basis for establishing the permanent International Criminal Court.
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For Rwanda, the international community was at a loss for a decision on how to respond. 
On one side, should they intervene forcibly overriding the sovereignty of an independent State, 
Rwanda, to save lives? On the other side, should they allow the genocide to run its course 
without international intervention? The lack of a unified decision to use forcible humanitarian 
intervention in this case raises an altogether more pressing question: is forcible humanitarian 
intervention appropriate for the international community? The critics argue that forcible 
humanitarian intervention is rarely used for purely humanitarian purposes, that it is often a 
façade for the next generation of colonialism, that there is no clear “end” for forcible 
humanitarian intervention, and that it often does more harm than good. Are the numerous 
criticisms of forcible humanitarian intervention borne out in the case of genocide in Rwanda? To 
state plainly, was forcible humanitarian intervention appropriate in the case of genocide in 
Rwanda? To respond to this question, we must first fully understand forcible humanitarian 
intervention, as separate from humanitarian aid, and its implications, the events of the genocide 
in Rwanda, understand the international constraints in place during this time, the resolutions 
passed by the United Nations Security Council, and the manner in which the developed world 
responded. After doing so an evaluation of the validity of the criticisms of forcible humanitarian 
intervention can be made.
Forcible humanitarian intervention may be defined as: aid and action designed to save 
lives, alleviate suffering, and maintain and protect human dignity during and in the aftermath of 
emergencies by force, with or without consent of the state in question. The distinction must be 
made here that forcible humanitarian intervention implies the use of military force. 
Characteristics that mark forcible humanitarian intervention different from other forms of foreign 
assistance and development aid may be the following: it is intended to be governed by the
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principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality, and independence, reducing national interests 
governing the action of intervening (Keohane, Holzgrefe 2003). Traditional forms of basic 
humanitarian intervention are the following: material relief assistance and services (shelter, 
water, medicines etc.), emergency food (short term distribution and supplementary feeding 
programs), relief coordination, protection, and support services (coordination, logistics, and 
communications) (Malerba, 2000).
The case of forcibly intervening for humanitarian purposes in genocide in Rwanda is an 
excellent case to evaluate because of its ambiguous reception by the international community. 
Once it became clear that genocidal acts were taking place in Rwanda, there was no great push 
from any international power to intervene and stop the genocide. Regardless of who eventually 
intervened in Rwanda, it took several months for anyone to do so, and it is worth examining 
why, and if they were correct to do so at all. The atrocities that took place in Rwanda could well 
happen again and the international community would be presented with the decision to intervene 
forcibly or not.
SECTION II:
GENOCIDE AND REALISM, LIBERALISM, AND CONSTRUCTIVISM
To understand the international responses to these atrocities, we must look to the 
breakdown of European powers interacting in the Rwandan sphere well before the genocide. 
This includes theoretical approaches for international motivations for response to genocide. As 
explained by Michael G. Roskin and Nicholas O. Berry nation states behave in certain ways 
according to various factors largely explained in three main theories: realism, liberalism, and 
constructivism (Roskin and Berry 1994).
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Realism explains that nations will act in the interest of gaining power. Their motivations 
will reflect the desire to accumulate power in some form. This is also reflected in the arguments 
against forcible humanitarian intervention. Where there is little national gain, few national 
interests to protect, or no clear end date, realists would argue against forcible humanitarian 
intervention. Taking a realist approach to arguing against forcible humanitarian intervention, 
Daniel Bell and Jean-Marc Coicaud argue that we must focus on the limited funds available for 
forcible intervention in such an international crisis and we must look at how we can do the most 
good for the greatest number of people. They suggest that in the effort to achieve fairness across 
countries, this may be at the expense of fairness across individuals. For example, several nations 
felt it would be more “fair” to let what could have been presented as a civil war run its course 
and let the people govern themselves as they wish rather than step in at the first sign of violence 
and govern for them, simultaneously spending millions and ignoring sovereignty. The United 
States, for example, was still stinging from involvement in Somalia and did not want another 
incident to stain their record of international intervention. France, along with several other 
prominent nations may have thought that by allowing the Rwandan history to run its course, and 
supporting the party in power through what looked to the outside world to be a military coup by 
rebel forces; they were achieving the most good for the most people with the hope that they 
would be able to keep the rebels from threatening peace.
Liberalism explains that nations will act in a certain way because they understand a more 
just and cooperative world. Liberalists would not be seeking power but instead working to create 
a safer global environment because it would be what they see as “the right thing to do.” This 
inversely connects to arguments in support of forcible humanitarian intervention. There is an
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ethical standard to uphold, and liberalism would dictate entering a country to protect innocent 
lives should trump such aspects as national interest.
Constructivism refers to motivation based on specific national identities. This includes 
political ideology, cultural beliefs, and national standards and traditions. This motivation can be 
unique to a nation, or a cooperation of several nations sharing common beliefs or ideologies 
(Betts 1994). Constructivism theory depends heavily on the political ideology and character of 
the nation in question. For example, Nation A includes foreign aid and humanitarian intervention 
as a large part of their foreign policy, while Nation B follows a much more isolationist stance in 
their foreign policy, intervening where national interest is threatened. Nation A would likely 
intervene forcibly to protect humanity regardless of national gain, while Nation B would not.
ARGUMENTS FOR FORCIBLE HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION
After examining the previous theories explaining why a state will act in one way rather 
than another, we can examine more fully the arguments both for and against forcible 
humanitarian intervention. These arguments as well will affect how a state chooses to respond to 
international crises such as genocide.
The case for forcible humanitarian intervention will be addressed first. The cases for 
forcible humanitarian intervention is driven by the premise that it is morally and legally correct 
to do so by common international law. The sovereign State is expected to act as a guardian of its 
citizen’s security, but when the State fails to do so, or is itself the cause of the conflict it is 
assumed to have forfeited its right to that sovereignty (Rieff, D., Tharoor, S., & Daws, S. 2001). 
This applies to what the United Nations calls “heinous and shocking crimes against humanity” 
(U.N. 1945), which refers to “murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other
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inhumane acts committed against civilian populations, before or during war; or persecutions on 
political, racial or religious grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime within the 
jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the country where 
perpetrated,” as defined in 1945 in by the United States and other Allies in the Agreement for the 
Prosecution and Punishment o f Major War Criminals o f the European Axis and the International 
Military Tribunal in Nuremberg (Bassiouni 2011).
Thus sovereignty is not forfeited for every minor infraction, but for cases such as 
genocide and mass killings, particularly when the killings are carried out by the state, an example 
of which would be an incident such as the Holocaust 1933 -  1945. Finding the legal need to hold 
the world accountable to help, the United Nations produced the Convention for the Prevention 
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, adopted by the UN General Assembly on 9 December 
1948 (United Nations 1948). Key provisions of this convention include the following: the 
preamble references General Assembly 96(I) and re-affirms that “genocide is a crime under 
international law, contrary to the spirit and aims of the United Nations and condemned by the 
civilized world.” (United Nations 1948). In noting that genocide has inflicted great losses on 
humanity in all periods of history, the United Nations notes also that international cooperation is 
required in order to “liberate mankind from such an odious scourge.”
Article I importantly clarifies that genocide can be committed “in time of peace or in time 
of war,” linking the concepts of prevention and punishment, and implying an international 
sanction to be brought against the perpetrators (United Nations 1948). Article II defines 
genocide as a crime of intentional destruction of a national, ethnic, racial and religious group, in 
whole or in part. This article includes five punishable acts of genocide, including intentional 
physical destruction of the group in question. Article III adds four additional categories of
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genocide, one of which being complicity, though this was virtually implied in the concept of 
perpetration and derives from general principles of criminal law. This importantly includes those 
who assist in the perpetration of genocidal acts or allow genocide to take place while standing 
idle. One of the more controversial provisions in the Convention states that genocide will be 
punished either by a competent tribunal of the territorial State, or by “such international penal 
tribunal as may have jurisdiction.” (United Nations 1948). This was contested due to the 
argument of the necessary impartiality by those sitting on the tribunal, only to have it be upheld 
that the exercise of universal jurisdiction is authorized by customary international law (Schabas 
2013). Due to numerous forcible humanitarian intervention failures, such as the legal dilemma of 
Kosovo, the genocide in Rwanda, and the humanitarian disasters in Somalia and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, the Canadian government has since produced the International Commission on 
Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) in September of 2000, for the purposes of examining 
the question of when, if ever, the international community has the right to intervene in a 
sovereign state in the name of humanitarian intervention (Evans & Sahnoun 2001). This 
commission included prominent human rights leaders and produced the final report now known 
as The Responsibility to Protect, with the objective of producing “lessons learned” for the 
international community. This shifted the question from when the international community has 
the right to intervene, to who has the right to intervene. This responsibility is naturally first 
placed on the sovereign state, sovereignty being conditional on providing protection. If the State 
is unstable or unwilling to protect its population, or if the State itself is the cause of the threat, 
the international community has the responsibility to protect those populations against genocide, 
war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity (Evans & Sahnoun 2001). Threshold 
conditions, which are conditions that must be met before sovereignty can be breeched by military
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intervention, have been outlined by the ICISS in the effort to direct more clearly when 
international humanitarian intervention is necessary and to avoid further international crises such 
as Rwanda.
The threshold conditions include high loss of life, right intention, last resort, proportional 
means, reasonable prospects of success, correct authority granted by the UN Security Council, 
and clear operational objectives. The World Summit Outcomes overcame the last legal roadblock 
to forcible humanitarian intervention in 2005 when the UN officially affirmed that it had the 
responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes 
against humanity. The present legality and framework support a case for a “counter- 
restrictionist,” resting on two prominent legal claims: 1. The UN Charter commits states to 
protecting fundamental human rights, and 2. There is a right of forcible humanitarian 
intervention in customary international law. The counter-restrictionist argument cites most 
frequently Articles 2(4) and 51 of the UN Charter. Article 2(4) states “All members shall refrain . 
. . from the threat or use of force .  .  . in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the 
United Nations,” and article 51 states “Nothing in the Charter shall impair the inherent right of 
individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs” (United Nations 1945). The 
counter-restrictionist would argue that so long as there is no ulterior motive, such as intentional 
seizure of territory, the use of force to intervene for humanitarian intervention purposes is 
acceptable under the Charter of the United Nations (Bellamy, Williams 2006). The UN Charter 
addresses the importance of human rights in its preamble, and Articles 1(3), 55 and 56, all 
pertaining to protection of human rights as one of the principle purposes of the UN system. This 
implies a humanitarian exception to the ban on the use of force in the UN Charter. The case is 
also made that there is a moral duty to intervene to protect civilians from genocide and mass
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killing. There relates to an idea of common humanity, that all individuals have basic human 
rights and duties to uphold the rights of others. To a further extent, one may argue that today’s 
world is so globalized and integrated that massive human rights violations in one part of the 
world have an effect on every other part, also creating moral obligations (Bellamy, A., Wheeler, 
N. 2001).
ARGUMENTS AGAINST FORCIBLE HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION
The following six points present arguments against forcible humanitarian intervention:
Humanitarian intervention is often rarely deployed for purely humanitarian reasons. 
National interest is nearly always a driving factor, and is usually associated with two costs. If the 
primary interest is geopolitical rather than humanitarian, then force used will be biased 
politically. If states do intervene for purely humanitarian purposes, they quickly lose interest and 
leave the country, or simply do not have the capacity to continue an intervention for an extended 
period of time (Bellamy, A., Wheeler, N. 2001).
It is often seen as a façade for a new era of colonialism; goals of intervention being 
replaced with those of “civilizing” the third world. This means under the defense of 
“civilization,” the developed world feels justified intervening in the affairs of the third world that 
may not be humanitarian in nature at all and simultaneously creating a dependency similar to that 
of colonization (Bellamy, A., Wheeler, N. 2001).
Breaches of sovereignty in the name of humanitarianism erode the principle of 
sovereignty created by the Treaty of Westphalia. The Treaty of Westphalia 1648, established a 
series of peace treaties signed between May and October of 1648 in Osnabruck and Munster, 
ending the Thirty Years’ War (1618 -  1648) in the Holy Roman Empire. These treaties resulted
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from the first modern diplomatic congress, thereby initiating a new political order in central 
Europe. The treaty was based on the concept of a sovereign State and has been governing the 
world ever since its creation in 1648. The argument here is that a treaty in place for over 300 
years should withstand any attempts to diminish it. This erosion comes at two costs: diminishing 
the authority of the body best suited to protect the interest of its people and setting a dangerous 
precedent for future violations of the principle of sovereignty. If one nation feels a breach of 
sovereignty occurred, does that provide justification for intervention, possibly armed, such as 
that in Kosovo? A very subjective door is left open when we say that anyone may claim criterion 
for the forfeit of sovereignty has occurred. States such as Russia and China are more than 
capable today to intervene where they see fit, and would likely do so if not for their strong non- 
interventionist policies currently in place from the Post-Cold War era.
In some cases it is better to let a conflict run its course. Political scientist Edward N. 
Luttwak states that “although war is a great evil, it does have a great virtue: it can resolve 
political conflicts and lead to peace.” Though war may be devastating to a culture or a people, it 
may be, in some cases, a way to achieve peace and allow underlying conditions to be resolved 
(Luttwak 1999). The key is that the fighting must continue until a resolution is reached. War 
brings peace only after passing a culminating phase of violence. Hopes of military success must 
fade for accommodation to become more attractive than further combat. Since the establishment 
of the United Nations and the enshrinement of great-power politics in its Security Council, wars 
among lesser powers have rarely been permitted to run their natural courses. Typically, they are 
interrupted fairly early, before they could establish preconditions for a lasting settlement 
(Luttwak 1999). When conflict is halted due to forcible international humanitarian intervention, 
the immediate issue is subdued, yet the underlying conditions causing the conflict initially are
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left unaddressed, and leaves the state open to falling again to conflict (Bellamy, A., Wheeler, N.
2001).
With regard to the responsibility to protect, once humanitarian intervention is launched, 
there is no clear end date, flexible to each individual situation. An intervening state does not 
know how long they will be in country and they do not have any definitive time frame for 
intervention. Often forcible humanitarian intervention becomes permanent, and more and more 
costly to maintain, including rebuilding a stable state while supporting the people until a new 
government is formed.
Forcible humanitarian intervention often does more harm than good. States sometimes do 
exactly what they are claiming (and trying) to prevent -  gross violations of human rights and 
international law. Once a forcible aspect is introduced to the humanitarian cause, the principle of 
the matter is changed fundamentally from stopping killing to winning a military operation. When 
the mindset of humanitarian intervention is changed from stopping the killing to winning a war, 
the entire premise of the situation is changed, sometimes irrevocably (Bellamy, A., Wheeler, and 
N. 2001).
III CASE STUDY: RWANDA 
CHRONOLOGICAL ACCOUNT OF EVENTS:
1994 saw the explosion of decades of ethnic tension in the small, African country of 
Rwanda. In approximately 3 months, nearly one million people were massacred in the streets, 
markets, and marshes all around the country. The Hutu government, Presidential Guard, and
15
youth militia Interhamwe took up machetes and turned on Tutsi neighbors and friends. It was a 
genocide that shocked the “civilized” western world, most of whom could not comprehend the 
primitive actions taking place in the “dark continent.” Though the massacres that left people 
dead in the streets were publicized, foreign opinion chose to turn a blind eye. For many foreign 
powers, involving themselves in a genocide that threatened no national interest and offered no 
lucrative return was a very unattractive option. France was the only nation to volunteer to 
intervene, authorized by UN Security Council resolution 929, and carried out Operation 
Turquoise under the banner of humanitarian intervention creating a “safe zone” in the southwest 
region of Rwanda along the border of what was then Zaire. By denying genocide and refusing to 
call it by its proper name at the time, most international powers were able to avoid involvement 
until the genocide had all but run its course. When France finally intervened with Operation 
Turquoise, the genocide had already progressed for approximately two months leaving hundreds 
already dead.
The genocide for which Rwanda is still known today was neither spontaneous nor 
elaborately planned. There were common feelings of oppression by the Hutu who had long been 
second-class to the much favored and prosperous Tutsi. Ethnic conflict between the Hutu 
majority and the Tutsi minority had been witnessed in the years before, including instances such 
as arbitrary arrests and detention of citizens numbering upwards of 8,000, local officials inciting 
Hutu attacks on Tutsi civilians leaving over 300 dead in October of 1990 in Kigali, and the 
massacre of over 300 Tutsi civilians carried out by Hutu police, military, and civilians in 
Kibilira, a prefecture of Gisenyi (Dorn, A. W., & Matloff, J. 2000). Though the rest of the world 
initially may have not felt intervention necessary, anti-Tutsi propaganda increased until the plane 
carrying presidents Juvénal Habyarimana of Rwanda and Cyprien Ntaryamira of Burundi
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crashed in the evening of April 6, 1994, triggering full blown massacres throughout the country 
spreading from Kigali out into the countryside. When many think of genocide, the Holocaust and 
gas chambers are the first thoughts, but here people were quite literally hacked to pieces in the 
streets, marshes, and fields by machetes. The industrial element of the holocaust was missing, 
replaced by much more gruesome techniques. Tutsi were hunted down and killed without mercy. 
Children watched as their mother’s arms and legs were hacked off and left to die, much more 
slowly than anyone could imagine. Few, if any, bodies were buried and they were left as 
evidence that the killers had done as ordered and hunted down former neighbors, schoolmates, or 
coworkers. The machete was a natural tool to an already agrarian community, and it appeared 
one step from cutting crops to cutting limbs. Though the rest of the world is nauseated to hear of 
these atrocities, for hundreds of thousands of Tutsi it was a nightmare that would not end. Many 
Tutsi survived to live with the shadows of death following them constantly, only to return to life 
as “normal” with their Hutu neighbors resuming their daily lives as well. They moved home or 
what was left of what they called “home” and resumed as though the atrocities had not taken 
place (Hatzfeld 2006). Without closure, this country is haunted not by the “skeletons” in their 
closet but by those strewn though their streets, schools, and churches (Prunier 1995).
Philip Gourevitch, in his book We Wish to Inform you that Tomorrow we will be Killed 
with our Families, draws upon the European history of involvement with Rwanda as a platform 
for his analyses. This begins with colonialism to follow the events of the genocide and the 
actions of the international community as each event took place. He explains that “race science” 
was very popular in Europe, where European scientists found themselves looking to science to 
pinpoint specific differences in races, then choosing one superior to another (Gourevitch, 1998). 
Gourevitch explains that cartographers at the Conference of Berlin (1885) marked Rwanda and
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Burundi as part of the German East Africa, but it was a place so far removed and ignored that 
little attention was paid (Berlin West Africa Conference 2008). “Even slave traders seemed to 
pass this place by” and during the Conference of Berlin as Africa was carved up, few if any 
white men had ever set foot in Rwanda (Gourevitch 1998). Soon after World War I, the League 
of Nations handed Rwanda to Belgium for rule and management. This did not make it expressly 
a Belgian colony; rather Rwanda was placed as such under Belgian trusteeship, meaning that 
Belgium was under international pressure to “get Rwanda ready for independence,” (Gourevitch 
1998).
This seemed most easily accomplished for the Belgians by using the natural segregation 
of the Tutsis and the Hutus already present in Rwanda. Even before German colonization, three 
ethnic groups existed in Rwanda: the Hutu (85%), Tutsi (14%), and Twa (1%). The Hutu lived 
more agriculturally while the Tutsi lived raising cattle. The Belgian organization of power then 
instituted the system of identification cards, designating one Hutu or Tutsi, to be carried at all 
times. Under Belgium, a new ethnically segregated state, church, and education system emerged, 
strongly favoring the Tutsi over Hutu. From a Belgian standpoint, the Tutsis were in a minority 
position, the Hutus being the majority, making it easier to appeal to, bolster, and support the 
minority in order to maintain control over the majority of the population. The identification card 
plan ran deeper than intended. Jones (2006) agrees that the institution of the Identification card 
played a significant role in firing up the emotion and feeling of difference in the population. In 
no real way are these people different from one another. They share a language, culture, and 
daily life. After having pushed the position that the Tutsi were a better class of citizen, “taking it 
back” proved extremely difficult, particularly when Belgium switched its allegiance and support 
in 1956 to the Hutu power as they drew closer to independence (Jones 2006). Belgium had
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managed Rwanda as an oligarchy, rule of the few for themselves, because it benefitted them to 
do so. Once it became evident that Rwanda was going to become a new, independent, 
theoretically democratic nation, it benefitted Belgium much more to support those who were 
likely to win election and hold office: the Hutu.
As Rwanda moved into a self-governing state, the first elections were held in 1962, 
placing Hutu Gregoire Kayibanda in the presidency. Only eleven years after the first election, 
more extreme Hutu power took control in a military coup, placing Juvenal Habyarimana in the 
position of president July 5, 1973. After several peace talks known as the Arusha Peace Accords, 
held in Arusha, Tanzania, transition to democratic power including a government that comprised 
both Hutu and Tutsi representatives was installed, still with Habyarimana as president. Far from 
stability, assassinations took place, and ten Belgian peacekeepers that had been stationed in 
Kigali during governmental transitions, were captured, tortured, and murdered (Jones 2006).
This crossed a tripwire, signaling to the rest of the world that a civil war had begun, and 
European States pulled their people out, except a few hundred peacekeepers under General 
Romeo Dallaire, working for UNAMIR.
ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS:
First the United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda was established an observer 
to Uganda/Rwanda by Security Council resolution 846, adopted unanimously on 22 June 1993. 
The purpose of this mission was to verify the transit or transport, by roads or tracks, of lethal 
weapons and ammunition across the border of Uganda into Rwanda. The undertones of tension 
in Rwanda were already evident to the international community, eased only slightly by the 
Arusha Peace Accords. Representatives of the government of Tanzania facilitated these Peace
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talks in Dar es Salaam, concluding the 4th of August 1993, with “a comprehensive peace 
agreement called for a democratically elected government and provided for the establishment of 
a broad-based transitional government” (UNAMIR).
Following a UN reconnaissance mission to Rwanda from 19 to 31 August 1993, 
UNAMIR officially went into effect after the recommendation to the Security Council by the 
Secretary-General, for the establishment of a United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda 
following several observer missions held in the twenty years since Juvenal Habyarimana took 
control. This was accompanied by a mandate of “contributing to the establishment and 
maintenance of a climate conducive to the secure installation and subsequent operation of the 
transitional Government.” The principle functions of UNAMIR were: 1. To assist in ensuring the 
security of the capital city of Kigali. 2. Monitor the ceasefire agreement, including the 
establishment of an expanded demilitarized zone and demobilization procedures. 3. Monitor the 
security situation during the final period of the transitional Government’s mandate leading up to 
elections. 4. To assist with mine-clearance. Additionally, UNAMIR would assist in the 
coordination of humanitarian assistance activities in conjunction with relief operations (United 
Nations 1993).
By 1993 there was a “threefold increase in the number of displaced persons,” quickly 
overwhelming the local capacity to handle the situation. The “humanitarian response” as 
provided by the UNAMIR background included facilitating cooperation and ensuring security 
and safety of NGO/IGO operating in the area. Though several ceasefires were proposed, they 
were not carried out and UNAMIR in the area played a primarily stabilizing role. When the 
plane carrying the presidents of Rwanda and Burundi crashed, killing all on board, and generally 
considered to having “triggered” the genocide, UNAMIR was changed in several ways. After the
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brutal torture and killing of the 10 Belgian peacekeepers, the Government of Belgium withdrew 
its battalion from UNAMIR, the concentration was shifted to political negotiations, protecting 
civilians, assisting in evacuations, and “providing humanitarian assistance to large groups of 
displaced persons.” At this point in 1994 UNAMIR personnel numbers were reduced from 2,548 
to a mere 270 (United Nations 1993).
The following United Nations Security Council resolutions were passed in 1994 
pertaining to Rwanda: 893, 909, 912, 918, 928, 925, 929, 935, and 965. Resolution 893 was 
passed 6, January 1994 and reaffirms commitment to peace and notes progress implementing the 
Arusha Peace Accords. It notes increasing violence in Rwanda and finishes with remaining 
“actively seized of the matter.” Resolution 909 expressed “deep concern” for the delay in 
establishing the transitional government, and also remains “actively seized of the matter.” 
Resolutions 912 -  935 do little more than remain “actively seized” and noting continued and 
escalating violence. Resolution 912 called for increased humanitarian intervention but also 
introduces the concern for preserving the sovereignty of Rwanda. Resolution 918 introduces an 
element of self-defense capabilities by UNAMIR forces previously restricted to non-armed 
peacekeeping. It also importantly imposed an arms embargo preventing the sale or supply to 
Rwanda weapons or ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary police 
equipment and spare parts. Resolution 925 notes with “grave concern” reports indicating “acts of 
genocide” taking place in Rwanda. As UNAMIR was originally intended as a safety and 
humanitarian measure for displaced persons, it is also noted that they were “not to have the role 
of a buffer force between the two parties,” essentially leaving highly escalated conflict, mass and 
systematic killings, without international intervention. Resolution 929, passed the 22nd of June 
1994 is of particular importance because it is the resolution that authorized French military
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operation: Operation Turquoise. Resolution 929 notes “the offer by Member States to cooperate 
with the Secretary-General towards the fulfillment of the objectives of the United Nations in 
Rwanda . .  . and stresses the strictly humanitarian character of this operation which shall be 
conducted in an impartial and neutral fashion, and shall not constitute an interposition force 
between the parties.” This was supported by Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, 
authorizing all “necessary means to achieve the humanitarian objectives set out in the 
subparagraphs 4(a) and (b) of resolution 925” (UN Security Council 1994).
Resolution 935 was passed July 1st 1994, mid-genocide, and notes again possible acts of 
genocide, and flagrant violation of international law, “calling upon” the Hutu government to stop 
the killings. Finally resolution 955, passed 8 November 1994, establishes the International 
Tribunal for Rwanda, and suggests member states assist in the rebuilding and solidification of a 
new democratic government (UNSC 1994). This International Tribunal for Rwanda was 
established for the prosecution of persons responsible for genocide and other serious violations 
of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of Rwanda between 1 January 1994 
and 31 December 1994. It currently has 75 completed cases, including 16 pending appeal and 12 
acquitted. Eight of those tried have pleaded guilty and nine of the accused are still at large (UN 
Security Council 1994). The ICTR is governed by its Statute, and consists of three organs: the 
Chambers and the Appeals Chambers, the Office of the Prosecutor (in charge of investigations 
and prosecutions), and the Registry (responsible for providing overall judicial and administrative 
support to the Chambers and the Prosecutor). With the UN Security Council resolution 977 on 22 
February 1995, the seat of the Tribunal was established to be in Arusha, United Republic of 
Tanzania. It held jurisdiction in three forms: 1. Ratione Materiae; genocide, crimes against 
humanity, and violations of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions. 2. Ratione Temporis;
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crimes committed between 1 January and 31 December 1994. 3. Ratione Personae et Ratione 
Loci; crimes committed by Rwandans in the territory of Rwanda and in the territory of 
neighboring States as well as non-Rwandan citizens for crimes committed in Rwanda.
It is also worth noting that the Gacaca courts largely punished those who carried out the 
genocide. Gacaca was a traditional, informal means of conflict resolution on the village level 
involving respected village elders and open participation of local residents, used well before the 
genocide (Magnarella, P. J. 2012). The transitional government that assumed control of the RPF 
took control of Kigali arrested approximately 120,000 Hutu on suspicion of having been 
involved in the massacres. Lacking functional courts, qualified judges, and lawyers the 
government held prisoners without formal indictments for years in poor living conditions 
(Magnarella, P. J. 2012). In December 1996 Rwanda passed the “Organic Law on the 
Organizations of Prosecutions for Offenses Constituting the Crime of Genocide or Crimes 
Against Humanity,” which was broken down into four categories: Category 1 for planners, 
inciters, and leaders, and for particularly brutal or notorious killings, and acts of sexual torture. 
Category 2 for authors and accomplices of homicides. Category 3 for assault, and Category 4 for 
offenses directed at property only. Category 1 was originally punishable by death (but Rwanda 
has since abolished the death penalty), Categories 2 and 3 could serve up to live in prison, and 
Category 4 by nominal prison sentences and fines (Magnarella, P. J. 2012). Up to approximately 
11,000 Gacaca tribunals were created to deal with the massive amount of those accused of 
contributing to the genocide.
23
RESPONSE OF VETO POWERS:
The UN personnel present was sorely understaffed and ill equipped both legally and 
physically to intervene and could only hold out but so long. Initially Western priests and nuns 
barricaded themselves in churches to try and protect children and their families but they too 
could only deter aggression before they were murdered alongside the Tutsi they sought to protect 
(Melvern 2004). Several foreign powers such as the United States, the United Kingdom, and 
France initially supported a UN delegation going into Rwanda for political stabilization and 
humanitarian efforts, hoping also to avoid the negative headlines that would undoubtedly be 
pouring out of the country sooner rather than later and support the UNAMIR staff present.
Russia and China came together, maintaining a post-Cold War non-interventionist policy, 
insisting that the matter should be dealt with within Africa, primarily by the OAU comprising of 
several neighboring African states, though they voted along with the other 13 member states of 
the Security Council in passing UNAMIR. May 6th, 1994, brought a UN resolution presented by 
Spain, New Zealand, Argentina, and the Czech Republic calling for European reinforcement, but 
stronger and more influential states such as the U.K. and U.S. had come to support the non- 
interventionist policy of Russia and China who insisted that aid must come primarily from 
neighboring African states (Melvern 2004). Several nations pointed to embargos to cut off 
resources from being sent to Rwanda, but two nations present in the Security Council opposed 
this proposition vehemently: France and Rwanda (McNulty 2000). The comprehensive 
indecisiveness was then perceived as a United Nations act of stepping away and failing to 
actually intervene. This indecisiveness would serve as a tripwire signaling to Rwanda that the 
rest of the world did not care enough to intervene.
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ROLE OF FRANCE
Separately from the UN, France began acting unilaterally to intervene. As soon as 
President Mitterrand, who had a close personal friendship with Juvenal Habyarimana, of France 
received a call in 1990 that the Tutsi rebel army, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), crossed the 
border invading from Uganda into Rwanda, France sent help to the Hutu regime for the purposes 
of “stabilization” efforts (Prunier 1995). France proceeded to make contact with Brussels such 
that “no hard feelings” would occur with France entering their former trusteeship. Brussels 
responded by sending 400 paratroopers as well as other supplies following the French lead, 
intervening in the name of forcible humanitarian intervention (Prunier 1995).
A pillar of French foreign affairs had been in favor of humanitarian aid and intervention, 
and the French have been fiercely proud to see themselves in such a light. The French are a very 
proud people, and any threat perceived as “Anglo-Saxon” stepping on Francophone toes is a 
threat of which the French will fight for to the point of recklessness. Prunier discusses the 
“special relationship” France has with Africa, which may have something to do with a “mixture 
of old memories, shared material interests, and delusions of former grandeur,” or quite frankly 
that France considered francophone lands “part of the family” regardless of former colonialism 
(Prunier 1995). Certainly language and culture were cementing factors, possibly supporting the 
Fashoda Syndrome; which supports that the world is a cultural, political, and economical 
battlefield between the French and the Anglo-Saxons (Prunier 1995). Dating back to 1898 and 
the Fashoda incident in the Sudanese village of Fashoda, the theory exists that the French have 
been vigilant in guarding against Anglophone encroachment in what is considered francophone 
territories. The Fashoda Syndrome has since formed a cornerstone of France’s African policy, 
with the French presidential office in the Elysée containing a special Africa Unit (Cellule
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Africaine) known to cover anything from intelligence work to bribery (Meredith 2006). Whether 
this Anglo-Franco competition exists in reality or simply in the minds of the French is unclear. 
This raises the question however of whether or not this changes how we see the forcible 
humanitarian intervention on the part of the French, given their unclear intentions and already 
close relationship with Rwanda.
In the case of genocide in Rwanda, the UN Security Council approved French Operation 
Turquoise by resolution 929, to establish a “safe humanitarian zone” in southwestern Rwanda, in 
response to mass killings and ethnic violence (UNSC 929). President Mitterrand was pushed to 
the decision to sign off on Operation Turquoise after a compelling speech from Nelson Mandela 
at the June 13th Tunis meeting of the OAU, in which he called the genocide a “rebuke to Africa,” 
and insisted that something be done by the more capable Western world (Prunier 1995). The 
politics of France were divided in the summer of 1994, and some saw the desperate plea to “help 
the chopped up African babies” as an attempt to gain public approval ratings -  which it did, as 
the polls of public support of French force deployment had risen drastically (Prunier 1995). The 
French people were overwhelmed by a sense that humanitarian action must be taken, particularly 
in a state with which they shared their French language. The situation proved more and more 
dismal as French forces arrived on Rwandan soil, where they found few if anyone left to save. 
Their humanitarian cause was failing, leading the rest of the world to suspect ulterior motives.
The more involved the French became involved the more apparent it was that their aims 
were not purely humanitarian, providing evidence for the arguments and critics against forcible 
humanitarian intervention (Cohen 2007). As French forces entered Kigali, they were greeted by 
cheering Hutu crowds who were under the impression that their “back up” had arrived, a highly 
embarrassing situation for France who had been telling other global powers of how they wanted
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solely to champion the humanitarian, peaceful cause (Prunier 1995). Sadder still was the fact that 
as the French “Tri-Coulour” was raised at a makeshift command center for the French forces, 
many Tutsi came out of hiding thinking they were saved and their nightmares were over, only to 
be shot on the spot or captured by Hutus in the streets (Prunier 1995). Furthermore the 
announcement of French troops pouring into Rwanda undermined almost completely the work of 
Canadian UN General Dallaire, who had been working in Rwanda the entire time, well before 
France “decided to show up” (Melvern 2004). Dallaire calls the French intervention “nothing 
more than resurgence in the genocide” as evidenced by the so-called “safe-zones” created by 
France in the southwest corridor of Rwanda. Though intended to harbor relief efforts and protect 
genocide victims, it proved more to be a safe hideout for the perpetrators, and a way to smuggle 
them into neighboring Zaїre (Melvern 2004). This operation would prove to be a defining factor 
in all of France’s interactions in Rwanda. The safe corridor was set up and manned with French 
troops, yet somehow the killers and the leaders of the genocide were escaping responsibility and 
judgment, and leaving the country all together.
Interestingly Operation Turquoise was not at all the first of French interaction in 
Rwanda. Daniel Domergue explains in his book Cooperation et Interventions Militaires en 
Afrique: La Fin d ’une Aventure Ambiguё ? (Military Cooperation and Intervention in Africa: the 
End of an Ambiguous Adventure?) that from the 1960s on, France had in place a number of 
“defense agreements and covenants covering military and technical assistance” which allowed 
France to “guarantee defense, equip armed forces, and intervene where necessary on Rwandan 
soil” (Domergue 1998). Domergue and Olivier Lanotte agree that it is precisely this intervention 
that has received harsh criticism in post-genocide years. Domergue proposes that France has 
intervened primarily where their “interests” were indeed threatened, leading African leaders to
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use these treaties with France as a means to ensure that they remained in comfortably in power 
(Domergue 1998). This allowed both parties to use each other for less than ethical reasons, for 
example using France to supply Hutu génocidaires with arms and training.
More and more the Western world saw the genocide as “Tribal” and as though foreigners 
were powerless to help (Melvern 2004). Though these feelings were prominent among Western 
states, they are quite plainly incorrect. It has been stipulated by Michael Barnett, and agreed with 
by Oliver Lanotte, “France was up to its neck in Rwanda, providing not only military assistance 
but also training to those who committed genocide. It is unknown whether France was 
forewarned about the genocide, but there is little doubt that they did have good reason to suspect 
something much more than a civil war,” leading us to draw the conclusion that something could 
have been done differently (Barnett 2002). At no point did France ever try to disarm the Rwanda 
army or genocidaires (those who committed genocide), as they fled to various “safe” French 
areas (Barnett 2002). Melvem, Jones, and Prunier have also agreed upon this point. Several 
instances had arisen in which the French may very well have had other options, yet they 
appeared blinded by a “French Pride,” and an effort to restore former Gaullist grandeur. The fear 
existed that if they did not intervene, an Anglo-Saxon country would, leading more francophone 
territories to fall. There seem to have been several pre-existing factors that allowed Rwanda to 
fall under the terror of genocide, most of which may be traced back to the European sectioning 
off of Africa. The exploitation that followed colonization stunted the development of those 
nations, and though France did not colonize Rwanda, the concept of a francophone world 
appears to be such a strong motivating factor that several aspects that would have normally been 
taken into consideration (such as the ever rising death toll) were overlooked and hidden from 
public eyes.
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In recent years (2010 ‒ 2014), several Franco Rwandan talks have taken place in Paris, 
showing current efforts to amend the past blunders between the two nations. Nicolas Sarkozy, in 
2010, was the first French president to visit Kigali since the genocide, stating at a press 
conference: “What happened here is unacceptable, but what happened here compels the 
international community, including France, to reflect on the mistakes that stopped it from 
preventing and halting this abominable crime," (BBC 2010). The rift between France and 
Rwanda is likely to take much longer to heal, as the language of instruction in Rwandan schools 
has been changed to English from French and Paul Kagame, current president of Rwanda, 
appears determined to move the country away from francophone ties. Rwanda has since joined 
the Commonwealth ‒ which is a group almost exclusively comprised of former British colonies. 
Though Sarkozy has shown efforts to repair diplomatic relations with Rwanda, France is still 
home to several senior Rwandan genocide suspects avoiding trial (BBC 2010). If we are to learn 
anything from history, we can take these negotiations as a sign of progress and cooperation, but 
we can never know for certain how France would handle such an international cataclysm again, 
given the outcome of their forcible humanitarian intervention seeming to only prove the critics 
right.
RESULTS:
Given the data provided by the United Nations and evidence provided by the case study, 
we may evaluate the arguments against forcible humanitarian intervention.
1. Forcible humanitarian intervention is rarely carried out for purely humanitarian 
purposes. United Nations reports and Security Council resolutions pertain primarily
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to humanitarian intentions. This is consistent with the purpose of the United Nations, 
ensuring global cooperation and peace. The French Operation Turquoise however 
has become highly controversial for French involvement in the genocide. The further 
France progressed into Rwanda; the relationship France had with francophone Africa 
became increasingly apparent to be non-humanitarian. Hopes of restoring former 
global influence seemed to be driving the French initiatives in keeping a government 
in power that was in French pockets for decades (Macridis, R. C., & Aspaturian, V. 
V. 1967).
2. Forcible humanitarian intervention presents a façade for a new era of colonialism. 
The United Nations intention of intervention appeared to be supportive of forming a 
transitional, stable, government of Rwandans. The military operation carried out by 
the French, Operation Turquoise, showed signs of propping up the Hutu government 
with whom the French government had long been close with personally, and those 
who led the genocide, in doing so increased a dependency of Rwanda on France, 
thereby perpetuating dependence and maintaining the francophone family in Africa 
(Macridis, R. C., & Aspaturian, V. V. 1967).
3. Breaching sovereignty erodes the principle of sovereignty. The forcible humanitarian 
intervention in Rwanda set precedence for other such international crises that when 
mass killings and widespread violence are occurring, the international community 
will not intervene, and when they do it will be late, and potentially unhelpful. 
Sovereignty here was placed above the protection of innocent life. The manner in 
which the United Nations progressed first with observer missions and peacekeepers 
before finally authorizing military action by France demonstrates the dilemma
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created by sovereignty issues. The unwillingness of the United Nations to support 
any action violating sovereignty demonstrates how important this argument against 
forcible humanitarian intervention is. If the sovereignty of Rwanda was completely 
disregarded in this instance, one possible outcome would reflect the difficulties of 
reestablishing sovereignty for a state passed between colonial rulers for years before 
finally becoming independent and still being far from stability. Any action sent by 
the United Nations, for example UNAMIR, had “peace-keeping” capability, not 
“peace enforcing” capability. Peace keeping implies a pacifistic approach to non- 
violent peace keeping. In such a situation as Rwanda, where noted systematic 
killings were taking place, this was not sufficient. Thus in the effort to preserve 
sovereignty, full capabilities of preventing loss of life were not utilized.
4. Sometimes it is better to let a conflict run its course. In the case of genocide in 
Rwanda, “allowing a conflict to run its course” may have meant a number of 
outcomes. For example, it could have been a weeklong conflict in which Tutsi 
citizens were killed or moved to Internally Displaced Person camps (IDP camps), or 
the RPF may have come back in from Uganda and been strong enough to take over 
Kigali after little bloodshed. Following the arguments of Edward Luttwak, not 
allowing the conflict to run its course does not allow for the underlying conditions 
necessary for rebuilding a stable regime to surface. War has the potential to resolve 
political conflicts, also leading to peace. Whether both parties become exhausted or 
one decisive winner succeeds, the key to this theory succeeding is the necessary 
fighting until a resolution is reached. This argument accepts that violations of 
international law and human rights will happen in the course of conflict, and accepts
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that it is acceptable and unavoidable for war to lead to peace (Luttwak 1999). The 
fighting in Rwanda was basically allowed to continue uninterrupted by the 
international community, and eventually the Tutsi rebel army, the RPF took Kigali 
and “won.” There was massive loss of life in a short period of time, but Rwanda has 
drastically improved multiple aspects of their state in the twenty years since the 
genocide (Ruxin 2010). Where there were once few paved roads and a dying tourist 
sector, today the $500 tickets for tourist trips to see the mountain gorillas sell out in 
weeks and roadway infrastructure has improved dramatically (Ruxin 2010). 
Supporting this argument, Rwanda essentially carried out the necessary fighting itself 
in order to address underlying causes of the tension and aggression.
5. Once forcible humanitarian intervention has begun, where does it end? This 
argument suggests that there is no clear defining limit for “ forcible humanitarian 
intervention.” If the outside party leaves directly after conflict is resolved without 
addressing underlying causes, there is little chance of successfully preventing 
conflict in future. If the outside party lingers in the country of conflict, issues of 
sovereignty and dependency are raised, and putting costly maintenance 
responsibilities on the intervening state. France left Rwanda August 21st 1994 due to 
the expiration of the mandate for Operation Turquoise, but the mandates for 
UNOMUR, UN AMIR, and Operation Turquoise had all been extended several 
times, showing just how undefined a time frame for intervention can be.
6. Forcible humanitarian intervention does more harm than good. In this case study, 
forcible humanitarian intervention not only failed to halt the mass killings, but also 
through Operation Turquoise, trained and supplied arms to the genocidaires
32
responsible for the killings. In this case forcible humanitarian intervention did more 
harm than good. The intention to save lives and bring about a stable transition to a 
democratic government was never carried out, the UNAMIR personnel far too ill 
equipped legally and physically to protect victims and the French more interested in 
preserving French and francophone status in the world than saving lives.
CONCLUSION:
There is an overwhelming global reaction that the international community let Rwanda 
down, and some Rwanda citizens themselves have said that the only time they saw white people 
was when they were leaving (Hatzfeld 2003). President Mitterrand himself has been quoted 
saying, “Notre responsabilité est nulle” or “Our responsibility is worthless” upon reviewing 
French foreign policy documents concerning the “Rwandan affair” referring to the obligation by 
the international community as a whole, not just France, in the inaction that led to the death of 
hundreds of people (Lanotte 2007). President Paul Kagame, current president of Rwanda who 
neither learned French nor encourages it in Rwanda today, has been quoted following Operation 
Turquoise saying, “it’s criminal and the audacity rests without excuse. Their threats and efforts 
to intimidate us have had no effect.” Former Hutu rebel soldiers were quoted also in Lanotte’s 
article accusing the French of hiding other killers and helping them out of the country.
The forcible humanitarian action that took place in Rwanda has since met each of the six 
arguments against it leading to the conclusion that forcible humanitarian intervention in this case 
study was not appropriate and did not succeed. France’s close relationship with francophone 
Africa supports the argument that intervention was not for purely humanitarian purposes. The 
militaristic and political support provided by France for years before the genocide as well as
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supplying arms and training during the genocide create a dependency, or pseudo-colonial 
relationship between the two states. The breach of sovereignty by France unilaterally acting 
degraded the ability of Rwanda to govern itself until finally the RPF took control and was able to 
start stabilization -  a process still ongoing twenty years in the making. Rwanda was not 
permitted to run the course of its conflict without interruption, leaving the underlying causes of 
the genocide unaddressed and rebuilding a stable government difficult at every juncture. There 
was no clear end for the necessity of intervention, to the point that if Operation Turquoise had 
left sooner or if the RPF had not gained control of Kigali the conflict would still have been 
ongoing indefinitely. The French troops in Rwanda have, by Franco Rwandan Governmental 
Accords, trained and supplied with arms the genocidaires and permitted the escape of 
genocidaires through the “safe zone” established in Operation Turquoise creating more harm 
than good.
The international relations theories of realism, liberalism, and constructivism are all 
presented in the case of forcible humanitarian intervention in Rwanda. These theories 
demonstrate why certain states or international bodies acted in the ways that they did. 
Demonstrating realism, the observer missions created by UNOMUR and the assistance missions 
created by UNAMIR attempt to work around the realist fact that no one nation was invested in 
Rwanda enough to send their own troops until France in July. The composition of peacekeepers 
and experts from the various Member States sitting on the Security Council attempted to create a 
neutrality to avoid national interests in a realistic manner that it was an international 
responsibility to intervene together. The more influential veto powers of the United Nations 
Security Council were unwilling to send their own troops into genocide where they had no 
national interest and no national gain. Some states such as China and Russia felt that intervention
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should come from within Africa, but were also unwilling to potentially lose their citizens in a 
conflict that did not involve their states. Demonstrating liberalism, the French pretext for 
intervention was on a humanitarian basis. French foreign policy did pursue humanitarian efforts 
and through Operation Turquoise the safe zone created in southwest Rwanda for the protection 
of those being hunted down. More applicable than realism and liberalism in this case study is 
constructivism, involving political identities, cultures, traditions and values dictating why the 
French moved forward with Operation Turquoise and met such undesirable results. The French 
policy of Fashoda Syndrome, or Françafrique, has established a close relationship with 
francophone Africa, dating back to the Gaullist policies of cooperation during decolonization 
under General Charles de Gaulle. This has been seen as a way to perpetuate Frances’ role in the 
global arena as an influential power and restore a sense of former grandeur since lost (Macridis, 
R. C. & Aspaturian, V. V.).
Upon evaluating the arguments against forcible humanitarian intervention, they hold true 
in this instance of genocide: forcible humanitarian intervention did not work. This does not mean 
that forcible humanitarian intervention should never be used as an option, rather that it did not 
work in this case study and must be reevaluated if it is to work in future. It is not unthinkable that 
a genocide case such as this could happen again, and in our lifetime. We have already witnessed 
acts of genocide in Darfur and Kosovo, and serious crimes against humanity in Libya involving 
chemical weapons used on civilians. Though those instances differ from Rwanda in several 
ways, the concept of forcible humanitarian intervention remains the same. From what we saw in 
Rwanda, the world let Rwanda down and if we are to avoid such an instance in future we must 
fundamentally change the use of forcible humanitarian intervention.
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This thesis contributes to our knowledge as a community about response to genocide and 
encourages thought about whether forcible humanitarian intervention is appropriate or not. Once 
we understand why we respond and act the way that we do, we may be able to alter our 
responses. If we truly do want a safer, more cooperative world, we must be more proactive when 
we can in responding to these tragedies and absolutely more confident in our reactive measures 
in the name of peace. By analyzing this infamous question “what do we do?” in the face of 
genocide, we can better create the world we want to live in, safely and sustainably.
36
T A B L E  1
Major Reported Human Rights Abuses[59]
D a t e L o c a t io n H u m a n  R i g h t s  A b u s e N o t e
1 9 9 0  O c to b e r U g a n d a n  B o r d e r R P F  in v a d es  R w a n d a G o v e rn m en t o f  R w a n d a  s ta g e s  a  m o c k  R P F  a tta ck  on  K igali
O c to b e r K ig a li (m ajority)
A rb itary  arrests an d  d eten tio n  o f  citizens: 7 5 %  w e r e  T utsi. B y  
A p r il g o v er n m en t a c k n o w le d g e  arrest o f  o v e r  8 ,0 0 0  p e o p le
M o s t  r e le a s e d  w ith o u t ch arge b y  A pril 1 9 9 1 , b u t a b u se d  
w h ile  in  p r iso n
O c to b e r
K ibilira c o m m u n e  
p refec tu r e  o f  G isen y i
L o c a l offic ials in c ited  H u tu  a tta ck  o n  T utsi, o v e r  3 0 0  k illed , 
th o u sa n d s  f le d  their h o m e s  a n d  o v e r  5 0 0  h o u s e s  b u rn ed
O c c u r e d  right after th e  in v a sio n , g o v ern m en t d is sm isse d  and  
ja iled  th e  lo c a l offic ia ls b u t th ey  w e r e  s o o n  r e le a s e d
1 9 9 1
J a n u a ry -F eb ru ary
B u g o g w e  a n d  N W  o f : 
R w a n d a
M a s s a c r e  o f  o v e r  3 0 0 ,  p o ss ib ly  1 ,0 0 0  civilians o f  T u tsi 
su b g ro u p  k n o w n  a s  B a g o g w e  p e o p le , d o n e  b y  p o lic e , military, 
civilian offic ia ls a n d  civilians
F o l lo w e d  m a jo r  R P F  o ffen siv e  in  area , w h e n  R P F  ga in ed  
to w n  o f  R u h en g er i (o n e  night) a n d  r e le a s e d  all p r iso n ers
N o v e m b e r M u ram b i
A r o u n d  5 0 0  prim arily T utsi civilians fo r c e d  to  f le e , o n e  w o m a n  
k illed , girls r a p e d  a n d  m a n y  b e a te n  a n d  in ju red
F o l lo w e d  ser ies  o f  s a v a g e  a tta ck s  w ith  lo c a l offic ia ls  
partic ipating , v ic tim s in su lted  fo r  b e in g  T utsi
1 9 9 2  A u g u st K ib u y e  A r a
"Ethnic" m a s sa c r e s , 8 5  d e a d  a n d  2 0 0  w o u n d e d , 5 0 0  h o u se s  
b u r n e d  a n d  o v e r  5 ,0 0 0  p e o p le  d is p la c e d
F o u r  d a y s  a fter  a g reem en t o n  pluralistic transitional 
g o v ern m en t b e tw e e n  R P F  a n d  g overn m en t, arrested  killers 
m o stly  M R N D ( D )  or  affiliates
M a r c h B u g e s e r a H u n d red  o f  T u tsis  m a s sa c r e d
F o l lo w e d  in c item en ts  from  an  offic ial rad io  b r o a d c a s t  m a d e  
b y  F e rd in a n d  N a h im a n a
E n d  o f  y ea r N W  co m m u n es
L o c a l g o v er n m en t offic ia ls, o n  o rd ers  fro m  arm y, org a n ized  
a tta ck s  o n  T u tsis  c a lle d  "clear th e bush"; th o u sa n d s  fo r c e d  to  
f le e  h o m e s
G o v e rn m en t id en tified  Tutsi as R P F  a c c o m p lic e s  p rov id in g  
" co v er" fo r  in v a d ers , u s e d  this e x c u s e  to  kill a p p r o x . 2 ,0 0 0  
Tutsi from  1 9 9 0 - 9 2
1 9 9 3  January
International C o m m iss io n  o n  H u m a n  R ights a llege ser io u s and  
w id e s p r e a d  a b u se s
V is ite d  w ith  te n  ex p e r ts , re p o r t p u b lish e d  in M a r c h  1 9 9 3
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812 03/12/1993 • Need for a negotiated peace solution
• Gravely concerned with fighting in Rwanda
• Calls for respect of the ceasefire
846 06/22/1993 • Need to prevent fighting
• Request by Rwandan government and RPF for an international 
neutral force
• Urges the respect of international law
• Establishes UNOMUR (United Nations Observer Mission for 
Uganda and Rwanda)**
872 10/05/1993 • Welcomes Arusha Peace Agreement and urges parties to comply
• Stressing the urgency of the deployment of an international 
neutral force in Rwanda
• Establishes United Nations Assistance Mission In Rwanda 
(UNAMIR)**
• Monitors security leading up to elections
891 12/20/1993 • Welcomes the results of UN AMOR
• UNOMUR: successful for stability and confidence building 
mechanism
• Extends UNOMUR 6 months
893 01/06/1994 • Valuable contribution made by UNAMIR
• Noting incidents of violence
• Strongly urges all parties involved to fully comply with the 
Arusha Peace Agreement
909 04/05/1994 • Deep concern in the delayed establishment of the broad-based 
transitional government
• Noting deterioration of humanitarian and health situation
• Extends the mandate of UNAMIR until 29 July 1994
912 04/21/1994 • Expresses deep regret for failure to implement Arusha Peace 
Agreement
• Shocked at the tragic incident that resulted in the deaths of the 
Presidents of Rwanda and Burundi 6 April 1994
• Appalled at large-scale violence which has resulted in the death 
of thousands of innocent civilians
• Condemns the attacks against UNAMIR and other United 
Nations personnel leading to the deaths of and injury to several 
UNAMIR personnel
• Modifies UNAMIR: act as intermediary between parties; assist in 
the resumption of humanitarian relief operations
918 05/17/1994 • Strongly condemning the ongoing violence in Rwanda.  .  . 
numerous killings of civilians which have taken place
• Stressing importance of the Arusha Peace Agreement
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• Recalling in this context that the killing of members of an ethnic 
group with the intention of destroying such a group, in whole or 
in part, constitutes a crime punishable under international law**
• Recognizing that the people of Rwanda bear ultimate 
responsibility for national reconciliation/reconstruction
• Authorizes the expansion and extension of UNAMIR
925 06/08/1994 • Noting with concern the parties have not ceased hostilities or 
cease-fire
• Reports that indicate acts of genocide have occurred in Rwanda, 
which is a crime under international law**
• Noting the systematic killing of thousands of citizens
• Noting that UNAMIR does not serve the purpose of a buffer zone 
between the two parties
• Extends the mandate of UNAMIR, who may be required to act in 
self-defense in future
928 06/20/1994 • Considering the major issue of arms flow into concerning areas
929 06/22/1992 • Noting the offer by Member States to cooperate with the 
Secretary-General towards the fulfillment of the objectives of the 
United Nations in Rwanda and stressing the strictly humanitarian 
character of this operation which shall be conducted in an 
impartial and neutral fashion, and shall not constitute an 
interposition force between parties**
• Determining that the magnitude of the humanitarian crisis 
constitutes a threat to peace and security in the region
• Acting under Article VII of the Charter of the United Nations, 
authorizes the Member States cooperating with the Secretary- 
General to conduct the operation . . . using all necessary means to 
achieve the humanitarian objectives**
935 07/01/1994 • Condemning all breaches of international humanitarian law in 
Rwanda
• Noted massacres and killings have continued in a systematic 
manner throughout Rwanda
• Evidence of grave violations of international humanitarian law 
committed in the territory of Rwanda, including the evidence of 
possible acts of genocide
955 11/08/1994 • This situation continues to constitute a threat to international 
peace and security
• Grave concerns for indications of genocide
• Establishment of International Tribunal for the prosecution of 
persons responsible for genocide**
• Annex: Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda
• Articles I - XXXII
965 11/30/1994 • Recalling its resolution 955 of 8 November establishing the 
International Tribunal for Rwanda
• Welcoming the establishment by the Secretary-General of a Trust 
Fund pursuant to resolution 925
•  Expands UNAMIR’s mandate
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